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Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values:
An Experimental Study
By JACOB K. GOEREE AND THEO OFFERMAN*
Auctions are generally not efficient when the object’s expected value depends on
private and common value information. We report a series of first-price auction
experiments to measure the degree of inefficiency that occurs with financially
motivated bidders. While some subjects fall prey to the winner’s curse, they
weigh their private and common value information in roughly the same manner
as rational bidders, with observed efficiencies close to predicted levels. In-
creased competition and reduced uncertainty about the common value positively
affect revenues and efficiency. The public release of information about the
common value also raises efficiency, although less than predicted. (JEL C72,
D44)
Auctions are typically classified as either
“private value” or “common value.” In pri-
vate value auctions, bidders know their own
value for the commodity with certainty but
are unsure about others’ valuations (e.g., the
sale of a painting). In contrast, in common
value auctions bidders receive noisy signals
about the commodity’s value, which is the
same for all (e.g., firms competing for the
rights to drill for oil). While this dichotomy is
convenient from a theoretical viewpoint, most
real-world auctions exhibit both private and
common value elements. In the recent spec-
trum auctions conducted by the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), for ex-
ample, the different cost structures of the
bidding firms constituted a private value ele-
ment while the uncertain demand for the final
consumer product added a common value
part. Alternatively, in takeover battles, bid-
ders’ valuations are determined by private
synergistic gains in addition to the target’s
common market value.1
By focusing on the “extreme” cases, the lit-
erature has inadvertently spread the belief that
auctions generally lead to efficient allocations.
In (symmetric) private value auctions, optimal
bids are increasing in bidders’ values so the
object is awarded to whom it is worth the most,
and in common value auctions any allocation is
trivially efficient. When both private and com-
mon value elements play a role, however, in-
efficiencies should be expected. The simple
intuition for this result is that a bidder with an
inferior private value but an overly optimistic
conjecture about the common value may outbid
a rival with a superior private value. The pos-
sibility of inefficiencies in multisignal auctions
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1 Even the standard examples of pure private or pure
common value auctions are not entirely convincing. When a
painting is auctioned, for instance, it may be resold in the
future and the resale price will be the same for all bidders,
which adds a common value element. And in the oil drilling
example, a private value element is introduced when the
costs of exploiting the tract differ (substantially) between
firms.
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was first discussed by Eric S. Maskin (1992)
and further explored by Partha Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000), Wolfgang Pesendorfer and
Jeroen M. Swinkels (2000), Philippe Jehiel and
Benny Moldovanu (2001), and Goeree and Of-
ferman (2002).
This paper reports a series of first-price
auction experiments in which each bidder re-
ceives a private and a common value signal.
To determine the optimal bid, the two pieces
of information have to be combined and the
more weight bidders assign to their common
value signals the lower is expected efficiency.
For instance, if bidders ignore their common
value signals, the auction becomes a fully
efficient private value auction. In the other
extreme, when bidders ignore their private
value information, the auction is no more
efficient than a random allocation rule. Ratio-
nal bidders react to both pieces of informa-
tion, resulting in some intermediate degree of
inefficiency.2
Observed bids will differ from rational ones
when subjects do not (sufficiently) incorporate
the negative information conveyed by winning.
Indeed, there exists substantial experimental
and empirical evidence that in pure common
value auctions, bidders often ignore this adverse
selection effect and forgo some profits as a
result: the winner’s curse.3 While naive bidding
obviously results in higher revenues for the
seller, its effect on efficiency has not yet been
explored. One goal of this paper is to measure
the degree of inefficiencies that results when
both private and common value elements play a
role.
A second goal is to evaluate factors that are
predicted to raise efficiency and revenues. In
particular, we examine the impact of (i) a de-
crease in the uncertainty about the common
value, (ii) an increase in the number of bidders,
and (iii) the public release of information about
the common value. Intuitively, a decrease in
uncertainty about the common value makes the
private values more important, enhancing effi-
ciency.4 An increase in the number of bidders
has no effect on efficiency in pure common
value auctions, but improves efficiency in auc-
tions with private values since it tends to raise
the highest signal. In auctions with both com-
mon and private values, there is an additional
benefit: with more competition, bidders weigh
their common value information less, resulting
in more efficient outcomes. Due to this latter
effect even a moderate increase in competition
may substantially improve efficiency. Finally,
the seller often possesses information about the
object for sale. Paul R. Milgrom and Robert J.
Weber (1982) have shown that the public re-
lease of such information is beneficial to the
seller because it raises revenues. In addition,
public information disclosure raises efficiency
because it reduces the uncertainty about the
common value.
The paper is organized as follows. The design
of the auctions is explained in Section I. Section
II gives the necessary theoretical background.
The experimental design is described in Section
III. Section IV reports the experimental results
and provides an analysis of individual and ag-
gregate data. Section V concludes. The deriva-
2 Robert Forsythe et al. (1989) also consider auctions
with common and private value elements. In their setup the
seller has the option to truthfully reveal the quality of the
item, which resolves all uncertainty about the common
value part and transforms the auction into a private value
auction. When the seller provides no information, optimal
bids are based on bidders’ private value information and
their common prior about quality. In the sequential Nash
equilibrium, the seller reveals the quality of the item and
buyers assume the worst when no information is revealed.
The fully efficient outcome predicted by the sequential Nash
equilibrium is observed in the final periods of the experi-
ment. Oliver Kirchkamp and Moldovanu (2000) report an
experiment that compares the efficiency properties of the
English auction and the second-price auction when bidders’
valuations are interdependent.
3 For experimental evidence, see Max H. Bazerman and
William F. Samuelson (1983), John H. Kagel and Dan
Levin (1986), Douglas Dyer et al. (1989), Kagel et al.
(1989), Barry Lind and Charles R. Plott (1991), Susan
Garvin and Kagel (1994), Levin et al. (1996), Christopher
Avery and Kagel (1997), Kagel and Levin (1999), James C.
Cox et al. (2001), and Goeree and Offerman (2001). Field
studies also suggest that bidders are bothered by a winner’s
curse, see, e.g., E. C. Capen et al. (1971), Richard Roll
(1986), Richard H. Thaler (1988), and Orley Ashenfelter
and David Genesove (1992).
4 For example, when licenses to operate in a market are
auctioned, interested firms will have to estimate the uncer-
tain (but common) demand for the consumer product they
will sell. There will be more uncertainty associated with
licenses for new markets (e.g., wireless local loop frequen-
cies for multimedia applications) than with licenses for
well-established markets (e.g., vendor locations at fairs).
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tion of the Nash equilibrium bids for one of the
treatments is given in the Appendix.
I. Design of the Auctions
We consider a first-price auction in which
each bidder receives a private value signal, ti ,
and an independent common value signal, vi. A
bidder’s valuation is the sum of her private
value and the common value, V. The common
value is defined as the average of bidders’ com-
mon value signals:5
(1) V  1
n

i 1
n
v i .
This formulation for the common value has
previously been used in both theoretical and
experimental work.6 An advantage of the aver-
age formulation is that it is easier to explain and
understand than the “traditional” formulation of
the common value, where V has some known
prior distribution and bidders’ signals are draws
conditional on the particular realization of V
(Robert Wilson, 1977). While being simpler,
the average formulation captures the two main
features of the traditional formulation: (i) the
value of the object for sale is the same for all
bidders, and (ii) in order not to fall prey to a
winner’s curse, bidders should take into account
the information conveyed by winning. The dif-
ficulty of overcoming this adverse selection
problem may be mitigated, however, since bid-
ders will naturally be inclined to think about
others’ signals when forming an estimate of the
average.7 This should be kept in mind when
comparing our results to previous experimental
work using the traditional formulation.
When the seller publicly announces her own
estimate, v0 , of the common value, the expres-
sion in (1) changes to
(2) V  1
n    v0  
i 1
n
v i
where  represents the precision or quality of
the seller’s signal. The seller’s estimate is of the
same quality (higher quality) as a bidder’s esti-
mate when   1 (  1).8
II. Theoretical Background
While few people would dispute that most
real-world auctions exhibit both private and
common value features, surprisingly little is
known about their equilibrium properties. The
difficulty with multiple signals is how to com-
bine the different pieces of information into a
single statistic that can be mapped into a bid
(Milgrom and Weber, 1982 p. 1097). This is not
a problem, however, for the average formula-
tion in (1). It is routine to verify that the sum-
mary statistic is given by the “surplus” si 
vi/n  ti.9 The optimal bids then follow from
the work of Milgrom and Weber (1982) who
characterize the Nash equilibrium for standard
auctions when bids depend on a univariate
statistic.
First, let us introduce some notation. Due to
symmetry we can, without loss of generality,
focus on bidder 1 who has surplus s1  v1/n 
t1. Let y1 denote the highest surplus of the n 
1 others: y1  maxj2, ... ,n (vj/n  tj), and let
5 Hence, at the time of bidding a bidder knows only part
of her valuation.
6 Theoretical papers include Wulf Albers and Ronald M.
Harstad (1991), Sushil Bikhchandani and John G. Riley
(1991), Vijay Krishna and John Morgan (1997), Paul
Klemperer (1998), and Jeremy I. Bulow et al. (1999). Ex-
perimental papers include Avery and Kagel (1997) and
Charles A. Holt and Roger Sherman (2000).
7 Nevertheless, Holt and Sherman (2000) report clear
evidence of a winner’s curse in a two-person first-price
auction experiment using the average formulation in (1).
Avery and Kagel (1997) find similar evidence in a second-
price auction.
8 Equation (2) can be motivated as follows: suppose the
variance of the bidders’ signals is 2b (the same for all
bidders) and the variance of the seller’s signal is 2a. The
best (i.e., unbiased and smallest variance) estimator of the
commodity’s value is then given by V  (v0  ¥i1n vi)/
(n  ) where   2b/2a is a measure of the (relative)
quality of the seller’s information.
9 A bidder’s expected payoff is: e  (expected gain 
expected payment)  probability of winning. The expected
payment and the probability of winning are independent of
a bidder’s private and common value signals (but will
depend on her bid and others’ bidding strategies). More-
over, for the average formulation of the common value,
bidder i’s expected gain equals her surplus, si  vi/n  ti ,
plus terms that are independent of her signals. The first-
order conditions for profit maximization therefore deter-
mine optimal bids in terms of the surplus, si.
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Y1 (Y2) be the maximum (second highest) of all
n surplus draws. To keep the notation simple we
use only one expectation symbol, e.g., the ex-
pected private value of the winner E(twinner) 
EY1 (E(ts  Y1)) is written as E(ts  Y1).
Proofs of the propositions in this section can be
found in Goeree and Offerman (2002).
PROPOSITION 1: The n-tuple of strategies
(B, ... , B), where
(3) Bx  EV  t1s1  x, Y1  x
 EY1  y1s1  x, Y1  x
is an equilibrium of the first-price auction. The
winner’s expected profit is winner  E(Y1) 
E(Y2) and the seller’s expected revenue is R 
E(V)  E(twinner)  winner.
The intuition behind (3) is straightforward.
Since Y1 is the highest of all surplus draws, the
first term on the right side represents what the
commodity is worth (on average) to a bidder
assuming that her surplus, x, is the highest. The
second term shows how much she shades her
bid to make a profit.
When the seller publicly reveals informa-
tion about the common value, the optimal
bids in (3) have to be adjusted. The new
optimal bids are functions of the summary
statistic si  v i/(n  )  ti. With this new
surplus variable and a corresponding redefi-
nition of the order statistics, the Nash equi-
librium bids again follow from Proposition 1.
In other words, the functional form in (3)
remains valid.10
Expected efficiency depends only on the
weights bidders place on their common value
signals, and any factor that reduces these
weights will positively affect efficiency. This
intuition underlies the comparative statics re-
sults of Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: Expected efficiency in a
Nash equilibrium rises when (i) more bidders
enter the auction, (ii) information is publicly
released, and (iii) the variance of the common
value signals is reduced.
We end this section by discussing two models
of bidding behavior that include rational bid-
ding as a special case. First, assume subjects
weigh their private and common value signals
differently. When the summary statistic is si 
vi  ti , optimal bids become
(4) Bx  EV  t1s1  x, Y1  x
 EY1  y1s1  x, Y1  x
which reduce to the Nash bids in (3) if and only
if   1/n. Second, previous experiments
based on pure common value auctions have
demonstrated that subjects often fail to take into
account the information conveyed by winning.
Therefore we also consider a model of naive
bidding in which bidders replace others’ com-
mon value signals by their unconditional ex-
pected value:
(5) Bcurse x  EV  t1s1  x
 EY1  y1s1  x, Y1  x.
We refer to (5) for   1/n as the “Naive”
benchmark. Even though Bcurse ( x)  B( x)
for all x and , the models predict the same
winner because (4) and (5) are functions of the
same summary statistic, s1. Hence, there is no
efficiency loss due to the winner’s curse.
III. Design of the Experiments
We conducted seven treatments as shown
in the leftmost column of Table 1. The labels
“low” and “high” indicate whether the vari-
ance of the common value distribution was
small or large (column 6), the number indi-
cates group size (column 4), and the “” (or
“”) sign indicates that subjects were once
(twice) experienced (column 2). In the exper-
iment, subjects earned points, which were
converted into guilders at the end of the ex-
periment at a rate of 4 points  1 guilder
10 The Nash bid is: B( x)  E(V  t1v0, s1  x, Y1 
x)  E(Y1  y1s1  x, Y1  x), with the common value,
V, given by (2). The winner’s profit is winner  E(Y1) 
E(Y2) and the seller’s revenue is R  E(V)  E(ts 
Y1)  winner.
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(	 $0.50).11 The experiment was completely
computerized and consisted of two parts.12
Subjects received the instructions for the sec-
ond part only after all 20 periods of the first
part were finished.13
A. Part 1: The Basic Setup
The first part of the experiment lasted 20
periods. Bidders were given a starting capital
of 120 points, which they did not have to pay
back. In each period, subjects’ private values,
ti , were uniformly distributed between 75 and
125, i.e., ti 
 U[75, 125], as shown in column
5 of Table 1. Common value signals were
U[0, 200] distributed in the high-3 and high-6
treatments, and were U[75, 125] distributed in
the low-3 treatments. Both private and common
value signals were identically and indepen-
dently distributed across subjects and periods,
and the procedure for generating the signals was
common knowledge. Finally, we used a differ-
ent set of private and common value signals for
each treatment.
Bids were restricted to lie between the lowest
and highest possible valuation for the commod-
ity. In treatments low-3 and low-3, subjects
had to enter integer bids between 150 and 250
points, while in the other treatments bids had to
be between 75 and 325 points. At the end of a
period subjects were told the bids in their group
ordered from high to low, the common value,
and whether or not they won the auction. (In
case of a tie, the winner was selected at random
from the highest bidders.) Subjects only re-
ceived information about others’ bids, not about
others’ private or common value signals, and
the winner’s profit was communicated only to
the winner. The reason for disclosing all losing
bids is partly motivated by real-world auctions,
where all bids are often observable. This proce-
dure, which has previously been used by Kagel
and Levin (1986), may alleviate the winner’s
curse as subjects learn from observing others’
decisions.
B. Part 2: Public Information Disclosure
The second part lasted from periods 21 to 30,
and was designed to evaluate the effects of
public information disclosure on efficiency, rev-
enues, and profits. A subject’s starting capital in
period 21 equaled the total amount earned in
part 1 plus a 60-point bonus. While the effects
of increased competition and increased uncer-
tainty about the common value were investi-
gated in a between subject design, a within
subject design was used to determine the effects
of public information release. In each period,
subjects made two decisions. The first decision
was the same as in the one described in part 1.
After all subjects made their first decision they
received an additional signal about the value
of the object, the seller’s signal, and were asked
to bid again.14 The seller’s signal was an11 For statistical reasons, group composition was kept
constant during the whole experiment. Subjects did not have
this information to avoid repeated-game effects.
12 The experiment was programmed using the RatImage
Toolbox (Klaus Abbink and Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1995).
13 A translation of the instructions is available from the
authors on request.
14 This procedure to evaluate the effects of a public
signal does not affect subjects’ choices in an undesired way
(Kagel and Levin, 1986; Kagel et al., 1987).
TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Treatment
Subjects’
experience
Number of
subjects
Number of
bidders per
group
Private
values
Common
values
Quality of
seller’s
signal
Low-3 none 30 3 U[75, 125] U[75, 125]   1
Low-3 once 18 3 U[75, 125] U[75, 125]   1
High-3 none 30 3 U[75, 125] U[0, 200]   1
High-3 once 18 3 U[75, 125] U[0, 200]   1
High-6 none 54 6 U[75, 125] U[0, 200]   1
High-6 once 18 6 U[75, 125] U[0, 200]   1
High-3 twice 21 3 U[75, 125] U[0, 200]   7
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independent draw from the same distribution as
the common value signals of the bidders. Ev-
eryone in the group received the same seller’s
signal, and subjects’ private and common value
signals for the second decision were the same as
for the first. In all treatments, except high-3,
the common value in part 2 was given by equa-
tion (2) with   1. In treatment high-3 the
quality of the seller’s signal was higher,   7,
as indicated in the final column of Table 1. Only
one of the two decisions was actually paid out.
Decisions with and without a public information
signal had an equal chance of being selected for
payment, and subjects learned which decision was
chosen only after everyone had made both deci-
sions. They only received information pertaining
to the decision selected, and the information pro-
vided was analogous to that in part 1.
C. Subjects and Bankruptcy
Subjects were recruited at the University of
Amsterdam. The experiment was finished
within two hours and subjects on average
earned 61.25 guilders (	 $30.60). Their starting
capital of 120 points provided some buffer
against bankruptcy.15 A subject went bankrupt
when her cash balance became negative, in
which case she knew she had to leave the ex-
periment without receiving any money. If a
subject went bankrupt in a treatment with six
bidders per group, the computer bid zero for this
subject for the remainder of the experiment. The
other bidders in the group then proceeded as
before, now with one less opponent.16 If a sub-
ject went bankrupt in a treatment with three
bidders per group, the computer submitted Nash
bids for this person for the remainder of the
experiment. (We did not use zero bids in this
case because we feared it would make collusion
too easy.) The other two bidders proceeded as
15 Even when everyone plays according to the Nash
strategy there is some chance that the winner loses money.
16 Of course, if one of six bidders enters a zero bid the
theoretical predictions are affected (both for the Nash
benchmark and for alternative models). We take this into
account when analyzing the data.
FIGURE 1A. BIDS () IN PART 1 OF TREATMENT HIGH-3
TOGETHER WITH NASH BIDS (LOWER LINE) AND NAIVE BIDS (TOP LINE)
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before, now facing one human and one “com-
puterized Nash” opponent. The exact details of
these bankruptcy procedures were communi-
cated to all bidders when a bankruptcy oc-
curred. The periods after a bankruptcy in a
group of three were completed only to give the
remaining two bidders a chance to earn some
money; data from these periods were discarded.
Subjects who did not go bankrupt could vol-
untarily subscribe for one of the experienced
sessions. (Subjects who went bankrupt were not
given this opportunity.) The majority of sub-
jects in experienced sessions participated in the
same treatment as in their inexperienced ses-
sion. Treatment high-3 was conducted two
months after the other treatments, and subjects
in this treatment had participated in two earlier
sessions.
IV. Experimental Results and Analysis
The analysis of the laboratory data is divided
into two parts. In Section IV, Subsection A, we
report realized efficiency levels and in Section
IV, Subsection B, we test the comparative stat-
ics predictions. First, we discuss the occurrence
of the winner’s curse in the different treatments.
Figures 1–3 show actual bids together with
predictions of the Nash benchmark (bottom
line) and the Naive benchmark (top line). In all
treatments, the majority of the data are “sand-
wiched” between the Nash and Naive bids. Note
that actual bids tend to increase in surplus and
that the amount of overbidding (relative to
Nash) tends to be higher when a subject’s sur-
plus is smaller. This is indicative of naive bid-
ding: winning the auction is more informative
about others’ common value signals when own
surplus is small, so neglecting this information
leads to a larger bias.
Table 2 gives a more detailed account of the
winner’s curse. The third row of the table dis-
plays the fraction of observed bids that exceed
the object’s expected value given the empirical
distribution of bids and common value signals.
A winner’s curse is negligible in treatments
low-3 and low-3, which is not surprising since
the adverse selection problem is relatively small
FIGURE 1B. BIDS () IN PARTS 1 OF TREATMENTS HIGH-3 AND HIGH-3
TOGETHER WITH NASH BIDS (LOWER LINE) AND NAIVE BIDS (TOP LINE)
631VOL. 92 NO. 3 GOEREE AND OFFERMAN: EFFICIENCY IN AUCTIONS
in these treatments. In the other treatments,
however, the winner’s curse is clearly present.
The fourth row indicates that subjects rarely bid
above the object’s expected value predicted by
the Naive model. The latter result is mirrored by
the second row of the middle panel: average
bids predicted by the Naive model are signifi-
cantly higher than actual averages.17 The bot-
tom panel of Table 2 shows how costly
overbidding is in the inexperienced treatments
high-3 and high-6. In high-3, winners realize
only about half the available Nash profits and in
high-6, winners even lose money on average. In
low-3, winners make less profit than predicted
by either the Naive or Nash benchmark. One
reason for these lower profits is that the auction
is not always won by the bidder with the highest
surplus (see row 2), as predicted by Nash/Naive
bidding.
The performance of experienced subjects is
somewhat better. First, no bankruptcies oc-
curred in the experienced treatments, while
seven inexperienced subjects went bankrupt (6
percent). Second, earnings are higher in the
experienced treatments.18 Nevertheless, experi-
enced subjects still fall prey to the winner’s
curse and in treatments high-3, high-3,
and high-6 they systematically overbid at a
17 Bids show no systematic time trend within a treat-
ment. Nevertheless, some aspects in the data are consistent
with learning direction theory (Reinhard Selten and
Joachim Buchta, 1998). Most notably, when winning the
auction results in a loss, subjects increase their bid factor
(s  (n  1)/nE(v)  bid) on average by 22.9 (10.3) in
the inexperienced (experienced) treatment.
18 This improved performance may be either the result of
learning, selection, or both. Subjects that subscribed for an
experienced session earned, on average, 1.62 points per
period in the inexperienced sessions, while those that did
not subscribe earned 1.03 points. This supports the idea that
selection plays a role, although the difference between the
earnings is far from significant (a Mann-Whitney test with
subjects as the unit of observation yields p  0.77). The 45
subjects that participated twice in the same treatment earned
somewhat higher profits and deviated slightly less from
Nash (in an absolute sense) in the experienced session.
Thus, there are also some (weak) indications of learning,
although learning mainly occurs within the inexperienced
session, and not between the inexperienced and experienced
sessions.
FIGURE 2A. BIDS () IN PART 1 OF TREATMENT HIGH-6
TOGETHER WITH NASH BIDS (LOWER LINE) AND NAIVE BIDS (TOP LINE)
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considerable cost. In high-6, bids are now
cautious enough to result in a small profit, but in
high-3, bids are even somewhat higher than in
the inexperienced treatment high-3.19 To con-
clude, even though the average formulation for
the common value naturally stimulates bidders
to think about others’ signals, the data clearly
show evidence of a winner’s curse.20
A. Efficiency Levels
The efficiency levels realized in the experi-
ment are determined as follows. Let twinner de-
note the private value of the winner and let
tmin(tmax) be the minimal (maximal) private
value in the group. Then:
(6) realized efficiency  twinner  tmin
tmax  tmin
 100 percent.
The efficiency level predicted by a benchmark
is obtained by replacing twinner with the private
19 One possible explanation for why bids fall in treatment
high-6 while they rise in treatment high-3 is that in high-3
losers experience regret more frequently when they learn their
value is higher than the winning bid (46.3 percent in high-3
versus 36.4 percent in high-6). Furthermore, when they expe-
rience regret, it is stronger: in high-3 an average of 39 points is
left on the table versus 21 points in high-6. Thus, regret may
have caused an upward pressure on bids in high-3.
20 It is often argued that economic institutions correct indi-
vidual biases. In market settings, for instance, “biased” traders
can learn from “unbiased” traders via signals provided by
market prices. There is some experimental evidence that mar-
kets may alleviate the effects of judgmental biases (e.g., Colin
F. Camerer, 1987; Ananda R. Ganguly et al., 2000). Interest-
ingly, the selection process in auctions may aggravate individ-
ual biases, since the bidder with the strongest curse tends to
win the auction. The data confirm this intuition. A logistic
regression with the probability to win the auction as the de-
pendent variable and “surplus” and “curse” ( actual bid 
Nash bid) as independent variables, shows that the estimated
parameter for surplus is 0.10 (s.d. 0.003), the estimated param-
eter for curse is 0.06 (s.d. 0.003) and the estimated parameter
for the constant is 14.45 (s.d. 0.443). Hence, subjects with a
stronger curse have a higher probability of determining the
price for the commodity. This selection force may weaken in
the long run, however, as bidders with more severe curses go
bankrupt.
FIGURE 2B. BIDS () IN PART 1 OF TREATMENT HIGH-6
TOGETHER WITH NASH BIDS (LOWER LINE) AND NAIVE BIDS (TOP LINE)
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value of the bidder predicted to win. Since the
Nash and Naive model select the same winner
the predicted efficiencies are identical.
Table 3 shows the realized efficiency levels
by blocks of ten periods. Note that actual effi-
ciency levels of the experienced treatments are
roughly constant and in the same range as those
observed in the last 20 periods of the inexperi-
enced treatments. The low efficiency levels in
the initial ten periods of the inexperienced treat-
ments could be due to “noisy” bidding behavior,
which causes the ranking of bids to differ from
the ranking of surpluses. An alternative expla-
nation is that bidders initially place too much
weight on their common-value signal. In the
remainder of this section, we use the individual
bid data to discriminate between these two
explanations.
The Nash and Naive benchmarks make point
predictions. To evaluate these models an as-
sumption has to be made about how players err.
We invoke a common assumption: for each of
the benchmarks a random error term is added to
the predicted bid. The error terms are drawn
from a truncated normal distribution with mean
0 and variance 2, and are identically and
independently distributed across subjects and
periods.21 This method of transforming deter-
ministic models into stochastic models may be
criticized on theoretical grounds but there is no
a priori reason why one model is favored over
another. So this procedure seems adequate to
compare the “goodness-of-fit” of different
benchmark models.
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the
first ten periods and the final 20 periods sepa-
rately. The top panel pertains to the Nash and
Naive benchmarks. There is no obvious ranking
of the two models: the likelihoods of the
Nash benchmark are higher in treatments low-3
and low-3, but the reverse is true in, for in-
stance, high-3 and high-3. Glancing at
Figures 1–3 it seems plausible that there is
some heterogeneity among subjects, with some
21 The distribution is truncated to ensure that bids stay
between the lower and upper limit on bids.
FIGURE 3A. BIDS () IN PART 1 OF TREATMENT LOW-3
TOGETHER WITH NASH BIDS (LOWER LINE) AND NAIVE BIDS (TOP LINE)
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bidders suffering from the winner’s curse while
others do not. This is tested in the Nash-Naive
combined model, which allows subjects to bid
according to either the Nash or Naive bench-
mark.22 This combined model yields a much
higher likelihood than either of the two individual
models.
Finally, the B  Bcurse model generalizes the
Nash-Naive model by allowing bidders to give
their common value signals weight , which is
estimated from the data. (Recall that the Nash-
Naive model assumes that   1/n.) The bottom
panel of Table 4 shows that the inclusion of the
weight  results in a small, albeit significant, in-
crease in likelihood in the high-3 treatments, but
adds nothing in the other treatments. These re-
sults suggest that, while a substantial fraction of
the subjects fall prey to the winner’s curse, sub-
jects roughly weigh their common value infor-
mation in the same manner as rational bidders.
The main reason for the lower realized efficien-
cies in the first ten periods of the inexperienced
sessions is that behavior is initially more noisy
as indicated by the higher -estimates.23
22 To be precise, the unconditional likelihood L( xi,1, ... ,
xi,10) of player i’s choices xi,t in periods 1–10 is:
L xi,1 , ... , xi,10   p 
t 1
10
L xi,tNash
 1  p 
t 1
10
L xi,tNaive,
where L(xi,tNash) represents the conditional probability of xi,t
predicted by the Nash model, L(xi,tNaive) represents the con-
ditional probability of xi,t given the Naive model, and p is the
probability that a subject plays according to the Nash bench-
mark. The Nash and Naive benchmarks are nested as special
cases (i.e., p  1 or p  0).
23 We also estimated a model in which bidders make a
“logit” best response to the empirical distribution of bids
(with or without a winner’s curse). This model resulted in a
worse fit of the data (i.e., a 10–20 percent reduction in the
log-likelihood per observation). Finally, we estimated a
“discount” model in which bids are determined as a fraction
FIGURE 3B. BIDS () IN PART 1 OF TREATMENT LOW-3
TOGETHER WITH NASH BIDS (LOWER LINE) AND NAIVE BIDS (TOP LINE)
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B. Comparative Statics Predictions
In this section we consider the impact of
changes in the bidding environment on efficiency,
winner’s profits, and revenues. Table 5 displays
the effects of a reduction in the uncertainty about
the common value. According to both benchmark
models, efficiency should increase when uncer-
tainty decreases, as shown in the second row. This
prediction is borne out by the data. The realized
efficiency level is significantly higher in treatment
low-3 than in high-3, both for inexperienced and
experienced subjects (first row).
The effect of increased uncertainty on winner’s
profits and revenues depends on the benchmark.
Nash predicts that bids are lower because of the
increased probability of a winner’s curse and, as a
result, profits are higher. In contrast, naive bidders
neglect the fact that winning is informative and
hence are insensitive to the increased risk of a
winner’s curse. In fact, they bid higher when there
is more uncertainty, because the maximum sur-
plus, v/n  t, is higher when the common value
signals are drawn from U[0,200] than when they
are drawn from U[75,125]. The third row of Table
5 shows that actual profits are lower with less
uncertainty, although less so than predicted by
Nash (both for inexperienced and experienced
bidders). Revenue results are the opposite. Nash
predicts that revenues will decrease when the un-
certainty about the common value increases, while
the Naive benchmark predicts that revenues will
increase.24 Again, Nash correctly predicts the
downward shift in observed revenues and the ac-
tual change is close to the predicted change for
inexperienced bidders, but it is too small for ex-
perienced bidders.
of the (rational or naive) expected value of the object. This
model yielded similar log-likelihoods as the ones in Table
4. We prefer the benchmarks of Section II, however, as they
have a more sound theoretical foundation.
24 Note that the predicted change in revenues is not equal
to the change in profits because the total surplus is higher in
low-3 than in high-3.
TABLE 2—WINNER’S CURSE STATISTICS
Statistic Low-3 High-3 High-6 Low-3 High-3 High-6 High-3
Percentage of auctions with positive profits 75 62 48 81 61 52 64
Percentage of auctions won by highest
surplus
79 65 51 76 73 64 72
Percentage of bids (winning bids)  Eempa 19 45 57 12 54 38 37
(14) (21) (49) (8) (33) (30) (24)
Percentage of bids (winning bids) 
ENaiveb
7 6 17 3 7 9 3
(10) (10) (33) (2) (9) (9) (4)
Observed and predicted average bids and profitsc
Actual bids 189.6 172.6 182.4 189.5 179.5 176.7 175.6
Naive bids 191.5 186.7 194.3 191.5 187.0 194.6 187.0
0.09 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.02
Nash bids 188.3 159.9 171.1 188.3 160.4 169.3 160.7
0.28 0.01 0.01 0.17 0.03 0.29 0.02
Actual profits 7.27 11.88 2.75 9.62 10.55 5.34 12.44
Naive profits 12.02 8.54 2.67 11.72 8.83 2.23 9.31
0.01 0.33 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.29 0.05
Nash profits 13.34 21.77 10.01 13.05 21.96 9.83 22.45
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.02
a Eemp is the object’s expected value given the empirical distribution of bids and common-value signals.
b ENaive is the expected value assuming a winner’s curse: ENaive  vi/n  ti  (n  1)/nE(v).
c The p values of a Wilcoxon rank test comparing predictions of the benchmark models with actual data are displayed in
italics. Groups are the unit of observation. Test results are based on only three pairwise observations in high-6.
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Another important determinant for efficiency
of market outcomes is the degree of competi-
tion. Since Nash and Naive bids depend on the
surplus v/n  t, both predict that efficiency
levels increase with the number of bidders, as
shown in the second row of Table 6. The data
accord with this prediction. For both inexperi-
enced and experienced bidders there is a sharp
increase in the actual efficiency level when the
number of bidders is increased from three to six
(first row).25 The middle and bottom panel of
Table 6 show that for both inexperienced and
experienced bidders, revenues increase with the
number of bidders while winner’s profits fall.
Finally, consider the case where the seller pub-
licly reveals an independent estimate of the com-
mon value. This improves bidders’ estimates of
the object’s value, resulting in a more efficient
allocation. According to the Nash benchmark, the
disclosure of the seller’s information also raises
revenue. These predicted effects are stronger the
higher the quality of the seller’s information.
However, one of the central findings in Kagel and
Levin (1986) is that the positive effect of a public
information signal on revenue is mitigated when
bidders fall prey to the winner’s curse. The intu-
ition is that the seller’s information helps naive
bidders with high signals realize their signal is too
optimistic.
Table 7 shows that, by and large, bidders
change their bid in the direction predicted by
Nash, both when the quality of the seller’s signal
is similar to that of the bidders (  1) and when
it is higher (  7). The most common deviation
is that actual bids do not increase when Nash
predicts they should. Bidders do not seem to re-
alize that higher bids are warranted since the extra
information mitigates the winner’s curse.
Table 8 shows that the public disclosure of a
seller’s signal when it is of the same quality as
bidders’ signals has no effects on efficiency,
revenues, and profits (i.e., the effects are eco-
nomically small, not systematic, and most often
statistically insignificant). Note, however, that
this lack of effect is consistent with the predic-
tions of the different benchmark models.26 In
25 In contrast, if bidders would have weighed their pri-
vate value and common value signal equally, say, an in-
crease in group size from three to six would have resulted in
a substantially smaller increase in efficiency (from 63 per-
cent to 65 percent in high-6 and from 62 percent to 66
percent in high-6).
26 These results are also consistent with the results reported
in Kagel and Levin (1986). They investigate the effect of a
public signal in a pure common value auction and find that
revenues increase less than predicted by Nash. They report that
a public signal raises revenue when bidders do not fall prey to
a winner’s curse, while revenue decreases when they do. Note
that in our treatment high-3, where the winner’s curse is
most prevalent, the decrease in revenue is largest.
TABLE 3—OBSERVED EFFICIENCIES (IN PERCENTAGES) BY BLOCKS OF TEN PERIODS
Efficiency
Inexperienced Once experienced Twice experienced
1–10 11–20 21–30 1–10 11–20 21–30 1–10 11–20 21–30
High-3 High-3 High-3
Actual 54 68 68 73 62 72 71 69 71
Nash/naive 71 73 75 72 72 75 75 73 76
0.01 0.07 0.07 0.92 0.05 0.12 0.46 0.31 0.18
High-6 High-6
Actual 72 81 85 93 89 90
Nash/naive 94 86 91 92 88 91
0.01 0.05 0.07 1.00 1.00 1.00
Low-3 Low-3
Actual 79 87 89 90 91 86
Nash/naive 96 93 98 97 92 97
0.01 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.92 0.04
Notes: The p value of a Wilcoxon rank test comparing a model’s efficiency with realized efficiency is displayed in italics.
Groups are the unit of observation.
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contrast, the predicted effects of a high-quality
seller’s signal (treatment high-3) are sub-
stantial. There is a significant effect on realized
efficiency, although smaller than expected. The
effect on actual profits and revenues is rather
small and not significant. The observed changes
are roughly consistent with naive bidding, and
sharply contrast the large drop in profits and
large rise in revenues predicted by the Nash
benchmark.
TABLE 4—MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD RESULTS FOR PERIODS 1–10 AND PERIODS 11–30 (ITALICS)a
Statistic
Low-3
(n  300,
n  600)
High-3
(n  300,
n  519)
High-6
(n  527,
n  981)
Low-3
(n  180,
n  360)
High-3
(n  180,
n  360)
High-6
(n  180,
n  360)
High-3
(n  210,
n  420)
Nash (  1/n)
Nash 11.6 29.7 33.6 6.2 29.4 29.5 27.6
8.4 25.4 27.9 6.4 28.1 31.0 26.2
log L 3.82 4.74 4.87 3.22 4.74 4.76 4.68
3.53 4.60 4.71 3.26 4.70 4.79 4.64
Naive (  1/n)
Naive 11.7 27.9 29.5 6.6 16.9 28.0 18.3
8.8 21.9 26.2 7.0 18.5 34.3 23.2
log L 3.86 4.75 4.80 3.31 4.24 4.75 4.33
3.59 4.50 4.68 3.37 4.34 4.95 4.56
Nash-Naive Combined (  1/n)
Nash 8.2 26.4 36.0 3.9 20.2 28.1 22.5
6.0 21.4 27.6 4.9 27.3 30.6 23.8
Naive 15.5 20.0 13.9 7.5 13.9 7.5 10.5
15.5 15.8 12.5 10.4 12.9 8.8 12.7
pb 0.63 0.59 0.53 0.60 0.12 0.62 0.34
0.83 0.45 0.44 0.77 0.22 0.72 0.37
log L 3.77 4.60 4.57 3.10 4.08 4.30 4.08
3.38 4.32 4.31 3.20 4.15 4.49 4.21
B  Bcurse Combined
 8.1 27.4 36.6 3.8 20.0 26.8 23.5
5.6 21.9 27.6 4.8 20.3 30.7 25.3
curse 14.8 20.0 14.0 7.5 12.9 6.5 11.5
13.4 15.9 12.6 10.6 13.8 8.8 12.2
p 0.61 0.52 0.51 0.59 0.11 0.67 0.24
0.75 0.32 0.44 0.78 0.11 0.72 0.33
c 0.46 0.42 0.25 0.37 0.39 0.13 0.42
0.40 0.47 0.17 0.28 0.43 0.17 0.42
log L 3.76 4.60 4.56 3.09 4.06 4.28 4.06
3.37 4.30 4.31 3.19 4.10 4.49 4.18
Random
log L 4.62 5.53 5.53 4.62 5.53 5.53 5.53
a The negative of the mean log-likelihood per choice is displayed. The top number in each cell gives the estimate for
periods 1–10, and the bottom number (in italics) gives the estimate for periods 11–30.
b The parameter p denotes the probability that a subject correctly incorporates the information conveyed in winning.
c The parameter  is the relative weight that bidders assign to their common value signals.
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The data suggest the following explanation.
Without the seller’s information there is a sub-
stantial winner’s curse in periods 21–30. The
seller’s signal helps subjects to form a better
estimate of the common value, thereby allevi-
ating the winner’s curse. After the seller’s sig-
nal has been revealed subjects bid on average
somewhat higher (178.2 versus 171.9), but now
the winner’s curse has disappeared. In fact, they
bid somewhat less than the Nash benchmark
predicts (184.6).
V. Conclusions
The majority of the theoretical and empirical
literature on auctions pertains to either private
or common value auctions. A remarkable fea-
ture of these polar cases is that both yield fully
efficient allocations (in a Nash equilibrium).
Most real-world auctions, however, exhibit both
private and common value elements and ineffi-
ciencies should be expected, even in a Nash
equilibrium. This paper reports a series of first-
price auction experiments in which bidders re-
ceive a private value signal and an independent
common value signal. We investigate the extent
of inefficiency that occurs with financially mo-
tivated bidders. In addition, we test several pol-
icies aimed at reducing inefficiencies.
As expected, a fraction of the bidders fall
prey to the winner’s curse and this curse is more
severe when winning is more informative.
While there is systematical overbidding in most
treatments, bidders aggregate their private and
common value information in roughly the same
TABLE 5—EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE COMMON VALUE
Measure
Inexperienced Experienced
High-3 Low-3 p value High-3 Low-3 p value
Actual efficiency (percent) 62 85 0.00 69 89 0.00
Efficiency predicted by
Nash/Naive (percent)
73 96 0.00 73 95 0.00
Actual winner’s profit 11.88 7.27 0.27 10.55 9.62 0.38
Winner’s profit predicted by Nash 21.77 13.34 0.00 21.96 13.05 0.00
Winner’s profit predicted by Naive 8.54 12.02 0.10 8.83 11.72 0.52
Actual revenues 194.1 202.4 0.03 198.2 200.8 0.20
Revenues predicted by Nash 187.0 198.7 0.00 187.2 198.5 0.00
Revenues predicted by Naive 200.2 200.1 0.94 200.4 199.9 0.69
Notes: The third (sixth) column reports p values for Mann-Whitney rank tests, which compares treatments high-3 and low-3
(high-3 and low-3). Groups are the unit of observation.
TABLE 6—EFFECTS OF INCREASED COMPETITION
Measure
Inexperienced Experienced
High-3 High-6 p value High-3 High-6 p value
Actual efficiency (percent) 62 79 0.00 69 91 0.02
Efficiency predicted by
Nash/Naive (percent)
73 90 0.00 73 90 0.02
Actual winner’s profit 11.88 2.75 0.01 10.55 5.34 0.04
Winner’s profit predicted by Nash 21.77 10.01 0.00 21.96 9.83 0.02
Winner’s profit predicted by Naive 8.54 2.67 0.00 8.83 2.23 0.07
Actual revenues 194.1 211.8 0.00 198.2 208.3 0.02
Revenues predicted by Nash 187.0 202.8 0.00 187.2 203.8 0.02
Revenues predicted by Naive 200.2 210.1 0.00 200.4 211.4 0.02
Notes: The third (sixth) column reports p values for Mann-Whitney rank tests, which compares treatments high-3 and high-6
(high-3 and high-6). Groups are the unit of observation.
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manner as rational bidders would. As a result,
realized efficiencies are of the same magnitude
as predicted by Nash. Large differences occur
only in the first ten periods of the inexperienced
sessions, and seem mostly due to initially more
erratic behavior.
TABLE 7—QUALITATIVE EFFECT OF AUCTIONEER’S SIGNAL ON BIDS
Signal quality Nash bid b1  b2 b1  b2 b1  b2 Percentage
Seller’s signal weight   1 (n  1,570) N1  N2 334 71 39 28.3
N1  N2 38 11 19 4.3
N1  N2 133 196 729 67.4
Percentage 32.3 17.7 50.1 100
Seller’s signal weight   7 (n  210) N1  N2 58 0 5 30.0
N1  N2 1 0 0 0.5
N1  N2 22 8 116 69.5
Percentage 38.6 3.8 57.6 100
Notes: N1 (N2) denotes the Nash bid without (with) seller’s signal and b1 (b2) is the actual bid without (with) seller’s signal.
When   1, Pearson2  637.83 ( p  0.00), and when   7, Pearson2  111.77 ( p  0.00).
TABLE 8—EFFECTS OF THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE AUCTIONEER’S SIGNAL
Treatment
Efficiency (percent) Winner’s profit Revenue
Actual Nash/Naive Actual Nash Naive Actual Nash Naive
Low-3
Without 89 98 6.58 11.82 10.50 201.7 197.7 199.0
With 90 98 6.65 11.90 10.84 202.0 198.2 199.2
0.62 0.18 0.76 0.58 0.12 0.51 0.58 0.88
Low-3
Without 86 97 6.92 11.55 10.20 200.8 197.6 199.0
With 90 98 8.00 6.80 10.58 200.8 198.3 199.4
0.27 0.32 0.17 0.59 0.14 0.83 0.35 0.60
High-3
Without 68 75 15.71 20.36 8.44 192.8 189.5 201.4
With 66 82 11.33 18.07 9.90 194.6 191.3 199.5
0.67 0.04 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.58 0.40 0.16
High-3
Without 72 75 10.12 20.60 7.82 198.2 187.8 200.6
With 76 82 12.42 18.25 9.58 194.7 190.8 199.5
0.35 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.60
High-6
Without 85 91 0.01 9.18 0.84 207.7 200.0 208.3
With 82 93 1.13 8.46 2.06 207.9 204.1 210.5
0.21 0.11 0.95 0.14 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.01
High-6
Without 90 91 3.60 7.67 0.70 205.3 202.1 210.5
With 90 93 6.13 7.13 0.70 205.3 205.6 212.1
1.00 0.32 0.11 0.59 0.11 1.00 0.11 0.11
High-3
Without 73 76 11.89 21.76 8.59 196.2 187.1 200.3
With 82 94 13.14 14.01 12.30 194.4 196.2 197.9
0.09 0.02 0.31 0.02 0.20 0.50 0.06 0.87
Notes: Each third row reports p values for a Wilcoxon rank tests comparing the entry with and without an auctioneer’s signal.
Groups are the unit of observation.
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When the bidding environment is changed,
the Nash benchmark often correctly predicts
the direction of adjustments in bids but over-
states their magnitudes. The residual discrep-
ancy between observed and predicted changes
is best explained by assuming that a fraction
of the subjects bid according to the Naive
model. For example, an increase in uncertainty
about the common value leads to a substantial
decrease in efficiency, accompanied by a slight
increase in winner’s profits and a slight decrease
in the seller’s revenues. These results are in line
with Nash predictions, but the effects on profits
and revenues are smaller than predicted because
the increase in uncertainty aggravates the win-
ner’s curse. The public release of high-quality
information about the common value positively
affects efficiency, although again less so than
predicted by Nash.
Finally, our results indicate that more com-
petition is a robust way to enhance efficiency,
reduce winner’s profits, and raise seller’s reve-
nues. The reasons for these positive effects are
partly “statistical”: with more bidders, the win-
ner will on average have better information (i.e.,
higher signals). More importantly, however, an
increase in competition induces bidders to
weigh their own common value signal signifi-
cantly less, which makes their private value
information more important and an efficient
outcome more likely.
APPENDIX: DERIVATION OF THE NASH
EQUILIBRIUM BIDS FOR TREATMENT HIGH-3
Recall from Section II that the Nash equilib-
rium bids are given by
(A1) Bx  EV  t1s1  x, Y1  x
 EY1  y1s1  x, Y1  x,
where the surplus variable is defined as s 
v/n  t, and Y1 is the maximum of the n
surplus draws. For treatment high-3, the surplus
variable is the sum of two uniformly distributed
random variables: t 
 U[75, 125] and v 

U[0, 200]. It is useful to decompose the sup-
port of s into three regions: RI  [75, 125] 
RII  [125, 75  200/3]  RIII  [75 
200/3, 125  200/3]. The density of the
surplus variable can then be worked out as:
fI(s)  3(s  75)/10,000, fII(s)  3/ 200,
and fIII(s)  3(575/3  s)/10,000, i.e., the
density has the shape of a “trapezoid.”
An alternative way to write (A1) is
(A2) Bx  n  1
n
Evs 	 x
 Ey1y1 	 x.
The first term on the right side of (A2) can be
written as
(A3) Evs 	 x  
75
x
Evs  yfs y dy
with fs the density of the surplus variable. The
second term on the right side of (A2) equals
(A4) Ey1y1 	 x
 
75
x
y dFn 1y1y1 	 x
 x  
75
x Fsn 1y
Fsn 1x
dy
with Fs the cumulative distribution correspond-
ing to fs. The bidding functions on each of the
three regions can now be computed from the
conditional expectations EI(vs  y)  3( y 
75)/2, EII(vs  y)  3(y  100), EIII(vs  y) 
3( y  175/3)/ 2, and the expressions for the
density, fs, given above. The explicit formulas
are:
(A5) BI x 
22
15 x  35
for 75 	 x 	 125
(A6) BII x

5x3  240x2  18,125x  413,125
3x  1002
for 125 	 x 	 425/3, and
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(A7) BIII x

5,346x5  3,938,625x4  1,007,100,000x3  101,535,468,750x2  2,786,683,593,750x  71,985,771,484,375
459x2  3,450x  270,6252 ,
for 425/3 	 x 	 575/3. The optimal bids in
(A5)–(A7) are shown as the lower lines in Fig-
ures 1A and 1B.
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